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SHIELD LAWS: PARTIAL SOLUTION
TO A PERVASIVE PROBLEM
ROBERT M. O'NEIL*

Confidential communications have always been vital to a free
press because journalists must frequently rely upon information
gained in confidence from persons who do not wish that their
identities be revealed.' Governmental bodies and private litigators occasionally seek to compel the disclosure of such information,
but conscientious reporters have characteristically resisted this
pressure, even at considerable personal jeopardy. 2 The importance
of confidential communications to the media has increased during
the recent political scandals, civil disorders, and other challenges
to civic authority. 3 Thus, the pressures imposed upon a reporter to
reveal the sources of confidential information seem to be mount*Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. A.B. 1956, A.M. 1957, LL.B. 1961, Harvard University.
1. See generally Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen
ConcealingTheir Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 18 (1969).
2. Such a reporter was William T. Farr, formerly of the Los Angeles HeraldExaminer. Farr refused to reveal the identity of one who had furnished him with
a copy of a witness' statement during a murder trial involving the Charles Manson
"family." After being held in contempt of court, he appealed through the California courts. N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1972, at 23, cols. 1-4. Fan sought Supreme
Court review, but his petition for certiorari was denied. Farr v. Superior Court,
22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (2d Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011
(1972). Shortly thereafter he was ordered to jail. N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1972, at
36, cols. 3-5. He was finally imprisoned in the Spring of 1974 for 46 days, until
the indeterminate sentence was set aside and his release was ordered. N.Y. Times,
June 21, 1974, at 21, col. 1. Two weeks later the contempt order against Fan was
vacated. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1974, at 14, col. 6. However, on July 28, Farr was
once again incarcerated for refusing to reveal his sources; this time the imprisonment was for a term of five days, plus a fine of $5,000. N.Y. Times, July 30,
1974, at 40, col. 1. The contumacy to which these sentences relate occurred in
1970, yet Farr's appeal is still pending. N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1974, § 1, at 66, col. 3.
Similarly, another reporter who resisted the pressure to disclose the source of
his information was Peter Bridge, pf the Newark Evening News. Bridge refused
to answer certain questions put to him by a grand jury investigating alleged corruption in the city housing authority. The sentence, which eventually sent Bridge
to jail, was affirmed by the New Jersey courts. In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460,
295 A.2d 3 (App. Div. 1972). See also Bridge, Is the Press All Too Willing to Be
Neutralized?, National Observer, Dec. 9, 1972, at 15, cols. 1-4; Wicker, The NotSo-Free Press, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1972, at 47, col. 1.
3. This fact is evidenced by the dedication comments of Woodward and Bern-

NEW YORK LAW FORUM

[Vol. 20

ing. While the number of journalists actually held in contempt
of court represents but a tiny fraction of the working press, the
problem is growing and of sufficient importance to warrant th6
considerable study
it has recently received by legal scholars and
4
commentators.
Beset by such great pressures in the courts to disclose their
sources, journalists have quite naturally turned to state legislatures
for relief. The number of states recognizing the reporter's right to
withhold at least the identity of his source of confidential information continues to grow steadily, 5 and shield laws 6 are under consideration in many of the remaining states. Much attention has also
been devoted to the possibility of a federal shield law which would
pre-empt existing state laws and provide a uniform, national protection for the journalisfs confidential communications. A number
of bills have been introduced in Congress to create such a protection, but none has yet been adopted and the prospects for an early
enactment now appear rather dim. 7 Moreover, the legal community also appears to be divided over the desirability of national
stein, the investigative reporters claiming major credit for the exposure of Watergate:

To the President's other men and women-in the White House and elsewhere-who took risks to provide us with confidential information,
Without them there would have been no Watergate story told by the
Washington Post.
C. BERNSTEIN & B. WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN 7 (1974).
4. E.g., B. SCHMIDT, Journalist's Privilege: One Year After Branzburg, in
ANNUAL

CHIEF JUSTICE

EARL WARREN

CONFERENCE

ON ADVOCACY

IN THE

UNITED STATES 41 (Final Report 1973) [hereinafter cited as SCHMIDT]; Comment,

The Newsman's Privilege: Government Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions
and Private Litigation, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1198 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
5. See FREEDOM OF INFORMATION DIGEST [hereinafter cited as Fol DIGEST],
July-Aug. 1973, at 8.
6. The origin of the term "shield law" is not clear. It has been used popularly and colloquially since enactment of the first such "shield law" in Maryland
in 1896. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 2 (1971):
No person engaged in, connected with or employed on a newspaper or
journal or for any radio or television station shall be compelled to disclose, in any legal proceeding or trial or before any committee of the
legislature or elsewhere, the source of any news or information procured
or obtained by him for and published in the newspaper . . . in which he
is engaged, connected with or employed.
For a historical discussion of shield laws generally see Ervin, In Pursuit of a Press
Privilege, 11 HARV. J. LEGIS. 233 (1974).
7. See Cincinnati Enquirer, Mar. 31, 1974, at 3-D, col. 1. The lack of legislation is somewhat puzzling in view of the rather strongly expressed popular support for protection of journalists' sources. A Gallup poll found 57 percent of in-
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legislation to protect newsmen's sources. 8 Since the issue is still

very much open, discussion of its merits and shortcomings will
afford an opportunity for the analysis of several wider questions of

public policy and constitutional law.
The case for a national shield law is superficially persuasive.
While the data are not conclusive, journalistic reliance upon confidential communications does seem to be extensive. 9 Forced disclosure of sources may very well serve to deter future confidences
to a particular journalist and may place him in an extremely difficult (and possibly dangerous) position.10 While a number of states

have enacted their own privilege laws, both the variations between,
and the lacunae within, these laws cause them to fall far short of

providing optimal protection. The lack of uniformity has been
compounded by widely differing state court decisions; unlike other

areas of testimonial privilege," common principles appear not to
have been accepted even among the states that do protect journal-

ists' sources. 12 Given the increasingly interstate and national char-

acter of the major media, the value of a single standard of confidentiality is evident.
Apart from these recurrent arguments for federal legislation,
the Supreme Court itself has recently invited congressional action.
In Branzburg v. Hayes13 the journalists' claim to constitutional
protection for confidential communications was rejected by a nar-

row margin. Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice White stressed
terviewees supporting a newsman's right to protect the confidentiality of his sources
when called to testify. N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1972, at 48, col. 1.
8. See American Bar Group Opposes a New Shield Law, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5,
1974, at 26, col. 1. The House of Delegates of the American Bar Association had
voted 157 to 122 against the shield law proposals pending before Congress. See
also, for a report on the division of opinion, Fol DIGEST, Jan.-Feb. 1974, at 8.

9. For a thorough analysis of the extent to which newspaper reporters rely upon
such confidential sources, see Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege:An Empirical Study, 70
MICH. L. REV: 229 (1971).
10. See the discussion of the practical consequences of forced disclosure of
sources in Comment, supra note 4, at 1204-08.
11. In both the attorney-client and the physician-patient areas, the protection
of privileged communications has long been recognized. There is perhaps no better authority on the history, nature, and extent of these privileges than Wigmore.
As to the attorney-client privilege see 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2290-2329
(McNaughton rev. 1961); as to the physician-patient privilege see id. §§ 2380-2391.
See generally Barker, Toward a New York Evidence Code: Some Notes on the
Privileges, 19 N.Y.L.F. 791 (1974).
12. Compare In re Appeal of Goodfader, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961)
with In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
13. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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the practical problems inherent in defining such a privilege:
We are unwilling to embark the judiciary on a long and
difficult journey to such an uncertain destination. The 'administration of a constitutional newsman's privilege would
present practical and conceptual difficulties of a high
order ....
At the federal level, Congress has freedom to determine whether a statutory newsman's privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards and rules as
narrow or as broad as deemed necessary to deal with the
evil discerned and, equally important, to refashion those
rules as experience from time to time may dictate. .... 14
Not surprisingly, this invitation has increased the pressure for some
sort of federal protective legislation and partly explains the rapid
rise in the number of pending shield bills. Since Branzburg, legislation has seemed to become, if only by default, the most promising
protector of confidential communication.
There are, however, many serious reasons to question the
wisdom of federal shield legislation. The grounds for skepticism
are partly practical and partly theoretical. On the practical side,
the costs to newsmen of gaining the protection must be carefully
weighed against the uncertain benefits. At the theoretical level,
the many other types of confidential relationships that might be
adversely affected by legislation protecting only newsmen must
be considered. This broader perspective reinforces the practical
doubts about the wisdom of having federal shield legislation. The
remainder of this article will examine both the practical and theoretical concerns, beginning with the former.
I. THE PRACTICAL CASE AGAINST FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Even if one grants all the reasons favoring the adoption of a
federal shield law, it is still far from clear that the press should
pay the price. First, it is hazardous for the press to seek special
protection-especially in so controversial an area. For most sectors of
the economy, additional regulation can be absorbed with relative
equanimity. But for the press, any new legislative intrusion carries particular dangers.' 5 Certain forms of governmental regula14. Id. at 703-04, 706.
15. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974),
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tion, such as control of wages and hours16 or prohibition of sex differentiation in employment advertising,' 7 have been held to apply
to the media as well as other sectors of the economy.' 8 But pressure for a special new protection might open the door to further

regulation, perhaps in the areas of content and substance. Thus,
the press that truly wishes to remain free might best be advised

to seek as few favors as possible from legislatures and administra-

tive agencies.' 9
There is a second practical concern. The most logical constitu20
tional basis for a federal shield law would be the commerce clause.

In view of past Supreme Court decisions defining the scope of

Congress' power under that clause, 21 there seems to be little doubt

about the legal foundation for a national shield law. The relation-

ship between the media and the flow of commerce could amply
be demonstrated in ways that would support a pervasive and pre-

emptive federal law.
But there may be those to whom it seems somehow inappropriate to gain protection for so pure an interest as freedom of expression through the mundane medium of interstate commerce. The
commerce clause is not, of course, the sole potential source of
support for such a law. Congress might find such legislation necessary or appropriate for the protection of first amendment guarantees,
and rely on the enforcement provision of the fourteenth amendment to insure those guarantees. 22 Such an exercise of the implewhere the Court declared invalid as a first amendment violation a Florida statute
which required newspapers to grant equal space (for reply) to political candidates
who had been assailed in the newspapers' columns. The Court stated:
If it is governmental coercion, this at once brings about a confrontation
with the express provisions of the First Amendment and the judicial gloss
on that amendment developed over the years.
Id. at 254.
16. See, e.g., Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
17. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n On Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376 (1973).
18. See also Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), where the
Court held that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970), applies to
newspaper publishers as well as non-media corporations.
19. See ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY
IN THE UNITED STATES 15-16 (Final Report 1973).
20. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 3. See SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 47.

21. E.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 provides: "The Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." The freedom
of press guarantee of the first amendment was incorporated into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment by Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 723 (1931).

520
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menting power of Congress has been sustained by the Supreme
23

Court in the analogous context of civil rights legislation.
There are, however, two troublesome distinctions with the
analogy. First, in the civil rights setting, the protective legislation
came in the absence of any judicial declaration on the matter, where-

as any federal shield law would follow the Supreme Court's express
holding in Branzburg that the first amendment does not afford
24

comprehensive protection to a newsman's claim of confidentiality.
Secondly, the congressional power to effectuate any fourteenth
amendment guarantee under the equal protection clause may be

broader than its power to implement any Bill of Rights guarantee
merely incorporated under the due process clause. 25 The first

amendment route thus seems somewhat precarious; a wise draftsman of such federal legislation would best rely chiefly on the commerce clause with no more than incidental resort to the first amendment.
Perhaps the most substantial practical objection to a federal
shield law is the very complexity and variety of the terrain it must
cover. Many journalists would doubtless prefer an absolute privilege-that is, the right to refuse to appear or testify at all whenever a confidential relationship is endangered. But it seems most
23. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339 (1879).
24. 408 U.S. at 685. The Court found that authority weighed heavily against
exempting the newsman from a basic duty of appearing before a grand jury or testifying at trial:
These courts have applied the presumption against the existence of an
asserted testimonial privilege . . . and have concluded that the First
Amendment interest asserted by the newsmen was outweighed by the
general obligation of a citizen to appear before a grand jury or at trial pursuant to a subpoena, and give what information he possesses....
Id. at 686 (citation omitted).
25. The case law is somewhat ambiguous on this point. In Katzenbach v.
Morgan the issue was whether it was constitutional for Congress to pass a law
abrogating New York's literacy test voting requirement for certain citizens of Puerto
Rican descent. The Court held Congress has such power under section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment (set forth in note 22 supra). 384 U.S. at 658.
It construed section 5 to be analogous to the necessary and proper clause,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, in that it was "a positive grant of legislative power"
to Congress. 384 U.S. at 650-51. Thus, even if the voting requirement had been
able to "pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause," section 5 still gave Congress the power to determine that the requirement's abrogation was necessary
and proper in order to "enforce" the Clause. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112, 145 (1970) (opinion of Douglas, J.). Of course, it is questionable whether the
Court would extend its holding with regard to the applicability of section 5 to due
process matters, as well as equal protection.
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unlikely the Congress would ever enact so sweeping a safeguard
for the media. Instead, the privilege would almost certainly be
qualified-that is, the journalist would be obliged to appear and
subject his claim for the privilege to the judgment of the court
26
rather than simply make his own unilateral subjective judgment.
Even if the privilege were absolute in its subject matter, some definition of the persons entitled to claim it would still be required
-as Mr. Justice White pointed out in his Branzburg opinion.2 7
Thus, the task of drafting a comprehensive federal shield law would
be far more complex than that of enacting a federal statute creatig an attorney-client or a physician-patient privilege. This complexity is, in fact, partly responsible for the absence to date of any
28
congressional consensus on the subject.
A brief examination of the major topics will suggest how many
difficult issues must be resolved in enacting a shield law. There is,
first, the matter of who may invoke the privilege-should it be
limited to regularly employed full-time reporters, or should it extend to freelance reporters, college editors, members of the underground press, not to mention such more remote clamants as
scholars and researchers working with confidential sources? Such
a law would also have to specify the type of proceeding in which
the privilege could be invoked-grand jury hearing, criminal
trial, civil suit, administrative hearing, etc.-as well as the stage
of each type of proceeding at which the claim could be made, and
perhaps the process by which the claim would be adjudicated
and resolved. The scope of the shield would have to be indicated
-whether only the identity of a confidential informant would be
protected, or the content of the communication as well. (Most state
laws protect only the former, although a few go further and shield

the content as well. )29
In addition, the legislature should give consideration to the
status of journalists' "raw material," such as tapes and notes. The
recent controversy over the CBS outtakes for the "Selling of the
26. See FoI DIGEST, Mar.-Apr. 1973, at 2. In one of the cases reviewed by
the Supreme Court in the Spring of 1972, the reporter did refuse to appear at all

before the grand jury, fearing that even his appearance might jeopardize his relations with highly sensitive sources. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th
Cir. 1970), reo'd sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
27. 408 U.S. at 702-05.
28. See FoI DIGEST, Mar.-Apr. 1973, at 2.
29. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Supp. 1972) (protecting the source
of information); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1974) (protecting
the source as well as the content).
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Pentagon" program suggests one type of new threat. 30 Recent demands for the surrender of tapes in the possession of radio sta-

tions, 31 or for the delivery of reporters' notes to prosecutors or

defense attorneys 32 underscore the need for some definition of
the reach of the privilege in this dimension as well.
If the protection were to be qualified at all, in short, a clear

definition of its limits would seem essential. The range of possibilities might run from a broad privilege, which would protect
the confidentiality of all information (except, for example, information about a threat to life), to a very narrow privilege, which would

have to yield upon a demand for all relevant information sought~in
any civil or criminal proceeding.

This wide array of issues bears directly on the desirability of
federal legislation. It might be possible (as many states have done)
for Congress to enact a broad, vague shield law without resolving

the hard definitional and coverage questions. Such a law would
afford protection so uncertain that the quest for its passage would

hardly be worth the effort. On the other hand, Congress could grapple with the facts and issues, but the likelihood of consensus would
accordingly be reduced considerably. Thus, one comes to the view
expressed over a year ago by Washington Post publisher Katherine
30. The story is a long and complex one. The House Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee served a subpoena on the Columbia Broadcasting System,
demanding that it turn over to the Committee the "outtakes," in addition to the
material actually televised, on which the controversial program was based. N.Y.
Times, Apr. 9, 1971, at 1, col. 1. Later, the Committee voted to cite the network
and its president for contempt of Congress. N.Y. Times, July 2, 1971, at 1, col. 5.
The full House never did vote contempt orders, but the case caused much anxiety
in the media and threatened a serious breach in relations between Congress and
the media. For a more general comment, see O'Connor, Suppose "The Selling of
the Pentagon" Had Been a Newspaper Article, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1971, § 2, at
17, col. 1.
31. The manager of a Los Angeles radio station was jailed for refusing to turn
over to government investigators a tape recording relating to the kidnapping of
Patricia Hearst. N.Y. Times, June 20, 1974, at 36, col. 4. Later he was released by
an order of Mr. Justice Douglas, pending appeal. N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1974, at 40,
col. 7.
32. Defense attorneys in an illegal wiretap suit attempted to force a New York
Times reporter to release the notes from which he derived a story about the wiretapping (authorized by persons connected with the Nixon Administration) in connection with the drowning of Mary Jo Kopechne in Senator Edward Kennedy's
car. N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1973, at 21, col. 1. Earlier, the Village Voice lost its attempt
to protect from surrender the original manuscript of an article which it had published in an edited form. The manuscript was to be used as evidence against Its
author, an ex-convict on trial for his alleged involvement in prison riots. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 28, 1972, at 26, col. 1:
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Graham: "Any shield law which a majority of both houses would
endorse would be limited, qualified or hedged. And . .. whatever

33
a legislature gives, it can take away."
It is evident that the practical problems of securing federal
statutory protection are great: Two additional conclusions will
emerge: First, the actual extent of protection afforded by a shield
law is easily exaggerated; and second, the present need for such
protection may be less critical than initially it appears to be.
A shield law would be worth the effort expended in obtaining
it only if very substantial protection could be ensured. In fact, the
practical value of such a safeguard is uncertain. No case better illustrates the permeability of the statutory shield than Branzburg itself. The petitioner had resisted disclosure in the state courts,
claiming that he was protected by a Kentucky statute which provides that no journalist will be required to reveal in any proceeding
"the source of any information procured or obtained by him" following publication or broadcasting of that information. 34 The Kentucky
Court of Appeals held, however, that the shield law protects only
the identity of the source of confidential communications; since
Branzburg sought to withhold the identity of persons he had personally observed making and distributing illegal drugs, the law
35
afforded him no protection.
Since the Branzburg decision, other courts have reached a
similar conclusion about the reach of state shield laws. State courts
in New York, 36 Maryland, 3 7 and Ohio38 have all held that similar
33. Quoted in Fol DIGEST, Mar.-Apr. 1973, at 2. See note 141 infra.
34. KY. REv. STAT. § 421.100 (Supp. 1972).
35. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); cf. Hughes v. Meade, 453 S.W.2d 538 (Ky. 1970).
36. People v. Dan, 41 App. Div. 2d 687, 342 N.Y.S.2d 731 (4th Dep't), appeal dismissed, 32 N.Y.2d 764, 298 N.E.2d 118, 344 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1973).
37. Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. _
294 A.2d 149 (1972). In Lightman,
a newspaper reporter, engaged in the preparation of a series of articles dealing
with illicit use of drugs by young people, was compelled to reveal the identity of
the location of the pipe shop referred to in his article even though the shopkeeper
was the source of the information. In addition, there was a high degree of probability that such information would lead to the actual disclosure of his source of
information. The court held that
[w]here a newsman, by dint of his own investigative efforts, personally
observes conduct constituting the commission of criminal activities by
persons at a particular location, the newsman, and not the persons observed, is the "source" of the news or information ....
Id. at
-,
294 A.2d at 156-57.
38. Forest Hills Util. Co. v. City of Heath, 37 Ohio Misc. 30, 66 Ohio Op. 2d
66, 302 N.E.2d 593 (C.P., Licking County 1973).
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statutes protect only the identity of the confidential informant and

not the content (including identity) of information gleaned through
personal observations in the process of gathering news. These cases

suggest that the statutory shield-at least the common variety
which protects only the identity of the source but not content-is
a rather weak form of protection after all. 3 9
This does not mean that the journalist is without protection
from compulsory disclosure. To return again to the Branzburg

decision, limiting features of that holding should be noted. For
one, the inquiries which the Court sanctioned were by grand juries

investigating suspected criminal activity. Much stress was placed
on the "investigative powers" of the grand jury40 and the citizen's
obligation to further the process of criminal justice:

[Tihe investigation of crime by the grand jury implements
a fundamental governmental role of securing the safety of
the person and property of the citizen, and it appears to
us that calling reporters to give testimony in the manner

and for the reasons that other citizens are called "bears
a reasonable relationship to the achievement of the gov-

ernmental purpose asserted as its justification...

"41

The Branzburg majority limited the force of the holding even
further by cautioning that "grand jury investigations if instituted
39. The state statutes under consideration typically protect the "source of information" procured by a newsman. The distinction made in this "personal ob-

ser'ation" line of cases is between the "source" in a typical informant situation
and in the observation situation. In the latter instance, the source of the information,
even if that information is merely the identity of the actors or the nature of their
actions as well, is the reporter's personal observation, and is not privileged. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d at 347.
40. 408 U.S. at 668. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345, was joined for decision
with In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971), and Caldwell v. United
States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Gir. 1970).
Branzburg was a reporter who wrote an article about two persons who made
hashish from marijuana. He refused to divulge their identity to a grand jury. For
another article, Branzburg had interviewed drug users and observed them smoking
marijuana. In this instance, Branzburg refused to appear before the grand jury
when subpoenaed; instead, he made a motion to quash the subpoena.
Pappas was a television reporter who was afforded an opportunity to enter
Black Panther headquarters. Although he appeared before the grand jury, he refused to answer questions as to what took place inside the headquarters while
he was there.
Caldwell was a reporter for the New York Times covering black militant groups.
He moved to quash a subpoena ordering him to testify and produce his notes and
tape recordings concerning his interviews with Black Panther members.
41. 408 U.S. at 700, quoting Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 525 (1960).
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or conducted other than in good faith, would pose wholly different
issues for resolution under the First Amendment..
"4 (No claim
of bad faith was made in any of the three cases consolidated for review in Branzburg. In all three, moreover, the published writings
of the respective reporters supplied the only "nexus" between
the general inquiry and the calling of the particular witness.) The
majority continued its warning:
Official harassment of the press undertaken not for purposes of law enforcement but to disrupt a reporter's relationship with his news source would have no justification.
Grand juries are subject to judicial control and subpoenas
to motions to quash. .... 43
Since the decision was by a vote of 5 to 4, the brief concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Powell assumes a particular importance.
Stressing the "limited nature of the Court's holding,"'44 Justice
Powell urged a case-by-case approach to such questions-"striking . . . a proper balance between freedom of the press and the

obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect
to criminal conduct. . .. "' Under this test:
[I]f the newsman is called upon to give information bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject
of the investigation, or if he has some other reason to believe that his testimony implicates confidential source
relationships without a legitimate need of law enforcement, he will have access to the court on a motion to quashand an appropriate protective order may be entered ....

46

Thus, concluded Justice Powell, "the courts will be available to
newsmen under circumstances where legitimate First Amendment
interests require protection. ...

.47

The alignment of the Court in Branzburg suggests strongly
that under certain circumstances the Supreme Court could probably muster a majority for constitutional protection of newsmen's
confidential sources. If, for example, the same information had
been sought in a civil, rather than in a criminal, proceeding, the
42.
43.

408 U.S. at 707.
Id. at 707-08.

44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 710.
Id.
Id.
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governmental and judicial interests would have been substantially
weaker and the balance might well have tipped the other way.4 8 A
majority of the Court would be 'likely to insist upon a showing of
not merely a valid grand jury inquiry, but a substantial governmental need for the information requested. 49 While the Branzburg majority disagreed with the petitioners that a "compelling
state interest" must be shown, 50 Justice Powell implied such a standard by invoking a "legitimate need of law enforcement" as the
criterion. 51
There is a final limiting factor in the Branzburg decision. All
three reporters sought to invoke an absolute privilege and refused
to answer any questions. (One of them, in fact, even refused to
appear at all before the grand jury. The other two appeared but
refused to answer any questions in the area of alleged confidentiality.) As Professor Benno Schmidt observes, Justice Powell "seems
to suggest that the balanbe can better be drawn when actual questions are asked and the reporter refuses to testify. "52 What the
Branzburg cases lacked-and what Justice Powell presumably
would have found persuasive-was an ad hoc demonstration that
the particular questions were improper. 53 Thus, the Branzburg
decision may actually relate more to the timing and manner of the
journalist's plea than to its merits. At least it would be well to await
a more sharply joined issue in a later case before concluding that
the Supreme Court will not protect the confidentiality of newsmen s sources.
Recent lower court decisions tend to confirm this sanguine view
of Branzburg. Before examining the particular decisions, a few
words about the legal context may be helpful. Until about fifteen
years ago, courts did not even treat a journalist's plea for confidentiality as a constitutional issue. In the absence of a shield law
no protection existed whatever. 54 Claims to withhold sources
were summarily rejected. Courts usually cited Wigmore's decla48.
which
49.
which

See Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 784-85 (2d Cir. 1972), a civil case
does in fact distinguish Branzburg partly on this ground.
See Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972), a libel action in
the plaintiff sought to compel disclosure of defendant's sources for a magazine

article. The court refused to order disclosure, stating the plaintiff had presented
"no genuine issue to be tried." Id. at 993.
50. 408 U.S. at 667.
51. Id. at 709-10 (Powell J., concurring).
52. SCHMIDT at 44.
53. Id.
54. See Comment, supra note 4, at 1213.
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ration that a confidential relationship is irrelevant to a claim of
privilege, and that "[a]ccordingly. . . a confidential communication
to a journalist . . . is not privileged from disclosure." 5 The con56
stitutional issue surfaced for the first time in Garland v. Torre,
a libel suit in which the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit concluded that the plaintiff's interest in knowing
the identity of the allegedly defamatory source outweighed a columnist's claim of privilege. 57 Although the journalist did serve
ten days in jail for contempt of court following the unsuccessful
appeal, the constitutional principle was at least presented and
the way paved for future cases. 58
Since this initial resort to constitutional doctrine, the balancing of conflicting interests has become increasingly sophisticated.
Regardless of the outcome, and whether or not a shield law exists,
courts do weigh carefully the interests for and against compelling disclosure. 59 Very recently, the Supreme Court of Vermont
reviewed the issue as a matter of first impression and announced
the following test:
[W]hen a newsgatherer, legitimately entitled to First
Amendment protection, objects to inquiries put to him
in a deposition proceeding conducted in a criminal case,
on grounds of First Amendment privilege, he is entitled
to refuse to answer unless the interrogator can demonstrate to the judicial officer appealed to that there is no
55.

8 J. WIGsiORE, EVIDENCE § 2286 (McNaughton rev. 1961).

56. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
57. Id. at 549-50. Actress Judy Garland brought suit against CBS. Plaintiff annexed to the complaint an article written by Marie Torre which quoted a statement made by a "network executive" of CBS which plaintiff alleged to be defamatory.
In pre-trial discovery Torre refused to divulge the name of the source claiming a
confidential privilege. Plaintiff then instituted proceedings to compel Torre to
reveal the information. Upon Torre's refusal to do so after a court order, she was
held in criminal contempt. Id.
58. See Comment, 72 HARV. L. REv. 768 (1959).
59. For early analysis of the constitutional and policy issues, see two major
decisions: In re Appeal of Goodfader, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961); In re
Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
In Goodfader, a newspaper reporter was ordered to divulge his confidential
source of information concerning the discharge of the Personnel Director of the
Civil Service Commission of the City and County of Honolulu.. In his deposition
the reporter, Alan Goodfader, disclosed that approximately one week before the
Director was fired he received confidential information that an attempt to fire her
was being considered. On cross-examination Goodfader refused to disclose the
source of this information on the ground that to do so would be a serious breach
of his professional ethics.
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other adequately available source for the information and
that it is relevant and material on the issue of guilt or
innocence .... 60
A review of several recent decisions suggests the extent of
current judicial concern for the protection of journalists' confidential sources. The Second Circuit recently returned to the issue
of the Garland case and reached a somewhat different conclusion. In Baker v. F & F Investment, 61 the plaintiffs alleged discrimination and deception in the sale of houses to black families
in Chicago. They sought to discover the journalist's source of information for an expose on "blockbusting" which attributed to an
anonymous Chicago realtor statements about the very practices
that formed the basis of the suit. The author of the 'article (who
had since become editor of the Columbia Journalism Review) declined to name his source. The plaintiffs moved to compel disclosure, but the district court refused to grant the order.62 The
plaintiffs took an interlocutory appeal, 63 and the court of appeals
had before it-for the first time since Garland, fourteen years
earlier-the confidential source question.
The two cases are superficially quite similar. Indeed, the
equities of plaintiffs' civil rights claim in Baker may well be more
appealing than those of the defamed singer in Garland. But the
court found several distinguishing qualities. 64 For one, Garland.
involved a news item that went to the heart of the plaintiff's casethe identity of the person who made the key damaging statement
to the columnist. Secondly, the plaintiffs in the Baker case had
apparently made no attempt to obtain the information through
other channels, which might have availed. The Second Circuit
also distinguished Baker from Branzburg6 5 on the ground that the
latter was a criminal case involving strong governmental interests
not at stake in Baker: the integrity of the grand jury and the safety
and security of the community. By applying essentially the balancing test suggested by Mr. Justice Powell in his Branzburg concurrence, 66 the Second Circuit held in favor of the journalist, dis60.

State v. St. Peter,

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

339 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
Id. at 945.
Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972).
Id. at 784.
Id.
408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).

-

Vt.

315 A.2d 254, 256 (1974).
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tinguishing both its own prior decision and the Supreme Court's
intervening judgment. Surely this order of events should suggest
that Branzburg has not weakened, and may in fact have strengthened, reporters' constitutional claims.
Other cases provide further support for this view. One of the
many "Watergate" cases centrally involved a claim of journalistic
privilege. In Democratic National Committee v. McCord,67 the
district court quashed a subpoena seeking depositions and materials from national magazine and newspaper reporters relating
to the Watergate break-in. Here, as in the Baker case, a court felt
the proper approach was the balancing formula suggested by Justice Powell in Branzburg. The result was in favor of the journalists for several reasons: One, because "there [had] been no showing by the parties that alternative sources of evidence [had] been
exhausted or even approached;" 68 two, because there had been
no strong showing of the materiality of the documents requested;
three, because (unlike Branzburg) this was not a criminal proceeding; and four, because of an overriding public interest in protecting confidential communicationsThis Court cannot blind itself to the possible "chilling
effect" the enforcement of these broad subpoenas would
have on the flow of information to the press, and so to
the public. This Court stands convinced that if it allows
the discouragement of investigative reporting into the
highest levels of government no amount of legal theorizing could allay the public suspicions engendered by its

actions ....

69

One other recent case 70 deserves mention because it illustrates
another dimension of Justice Powell's Branzburg concurrence. A
reporter for a small community newspaper in Ohio was deposed
in a civil suit following publication of an allegedly defamatory story.
He refused to answer five questions, claiming a journalistic privilege. Three of the five questions were ruled out on the basis of
the state shield law, 7 1 since they called for identification of source
67. 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973).
68. Id. at 1398.
69. Id. at 1397.
70. Forest Hills Util. Co. v. City of Heath, 37 Ohio Misc.
66, 302 N.E.2d 593 (C.P., Licking County 1973).
71. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (Anderson 1967).

-,

66 Ohio Op. 2d
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rather than content of a confidential communication. 72 The remaining two questions were clearly not barred by the shield statute. After careful examination, however, the judge concluded
that both lacked the requisite showing of relevance to the subject
matter of the inquiry, and did not have to be answered. 73 Thus,
while an abstract claim of privilege or a blanket refusal to testify
would surely have failed in this case, the protection eventually
afforted by careful review of the particular questions proved to
be effective. This decision confirms the view that Branzburg may
only have been criticizing the prematureness of the claim of privilege, and that refusal to answer particular questions may stand
somewhat differently from refusal to answer any.
Despite some encouraging signs, it would be quite misleading
to suggest that the investigative reporter is out of danger. Indeed,
several recent causes cglebres suggest that the risks of using confidential sources may have intensified. The misfortunes of Los
Angeles Times reporter William Farr are illustrative. Cited for
contempt of court for refusing to name the source of a story he
wrote in 1970 about the Charles Manson murder trial, Farr was
sentenced to jail. 74 After 46 days of incarceration-apparently a
modern record for a journalist-he was eventually freed when a
California state judge held that indefinite commitment was an
inappropriate sanction. The judge acknowledged Farr's "commitment to the principle of confidentiality and to the promises he
has made" and found that there was "no substantial likelihood that
further incarceration . . . will result in his compliance with the
court's order. . .. "75 About the same time, Will Lewis, manager
of Los Angeles radio station KPFK, completed his second week in
jail for refusing to turn over to federal authorities materials sought
in the Patricia Hearst-SLA investigation. 7 6 (Significantly, California
is one of the states which recently amended its shield law, after
Branzburg, to immunize reporters who withhold confidential
, 302 N.E.2d at 597.
66 Ohio Op. 2d at
72. 37 Ohio Misc. at __,
73. Id.
74. See note 2 supra.
75. See N.Y. Times, June 21, 1974, at 21, col. 1.
76. N.Y. Times, June 20, 1974, at 70, col. 5. The manager was later released
on the order of Mr. Justice Douglas, pending appeal. N.Y. Times, July 6, 1974,
at 40, col. 7. See In re Lewis, 501 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1974).
Mr. Lewis was again convicted of civil contempt for withholding from a grand
jury a communique which he received in October 1974 from the New World Liberation Front. This latter decision explores the balincing of interest in some depth. In
re Lewis, 384 F. Supp. 133 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
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sources during grand jury investigations. 7 7 The New York Times,
commenting editorially on an earlier phase of the Farr litigation,
lamented that the California courts' interpretation of the shield
law "presents a powerful new threat"-the more so because of the
78
indeterminate jail sentence.)
We have, then, a troublesome dilemma: On the one hand, there
seems to be little doubt about the need for legal protection of
journalists' sources. Reliance on confidential information is a vital
ingredient of vigorous, effective reporting. On the other hand, it
is far from clear that federal shield legislation would be effective
in meeting these needs. Meanwhile, there are tentative signs
that the courts may do what the legislatures are failing to do, and
there are persuasive reasons for favoring the judicial approach,
despite the Supreme Court's apparent preference for legislation.
II.

THE LARGER CoNTExT: CONFnDENTiALrry

AS A TRANSCENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL IsSUE

Perhaps the most forceful reason for preferring "judicial legislation" to that of Congress is that the issue goes far beyond just the
protection of newsmen's sources. The probing of confidential relationships may jeopardize freedom of expression, association,
and the press in a variety of other contexts. While the compelled
disclosure of a reporter's source may be the most familiar threat,
it is by no means the only one. If energy and effort are devoted
to the enactment of a federal law specially protecting the journalist's sources, the other needs may well be neglected. Even worse,
enactment of legislation covering confidentiality in just one relationship may imply lesser protection elsewhere. The specific
danger inheres in the legal maxim, expressio unius exclusio alterius
est. If Congress were to pass legislation to protect one particular
confidential relationship, this action would strongly imply that
77. The California shield law now provides, in part:
A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed upon a newspaper, or by a press association or wire service, or any
person who has been so connected or employed, cannot be adjudged in
contempt by a judicial, legislative, administrative body, or any other body
having the power to issue subpoenas, for refusing to disclose, in any proceeding as defined in Section 901, the source of any information procured
while so connected or employed for publication in a newspaper.
CAL. EVID. CODE §

1070 (West Supp. 1974).

78. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1972, at 46, col. 1. According to the editorial, the court
held that immunity from contempt was cancelled by Farr's "willful violation of a
court order."
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other confidential relationships enjoy little or no legal protection.
Before creating such an inference through inadvertence, it would
be well to survey the broader field.
A. Representative Problems of Confidentiality
A series of recent cases (some litigated and others not) may
suggest the broader context of confidentiality.
(1) We begin with the case of Professor Samuel Popkin, a
young Harvard political scientist who had done extensive research
in Vietnam and was an expert on Vietnamese village life. When
he was called before a grand jury investigating the release of the
"Pentagon Papers," he refused to answer several questions which
may have required the disclosure of names of Americans and Vietnamese whom he had interviewed in his research. 79 He also refused to tell the grand jury whether he had ever discussed the study
with Daniel Ellsberg. He was cited for contempt of court and sentenced to up to 18 months in jail. With the official backing of Harvard
University, Popkin appealed unsuccessfully through the federal
courts.80 Popkin, however, was freed after about a week in jail
when the judge suddenly and unexpectedly dismissed the grand
jury whose questions he had refused to answer.81
The Popkin case is not unique. Sociology professor Albert A.
Reiss of Yale, a specialist in the study of police conduct, "refused
to reveal information about police crimes he had obtained during
his studies." 82 Professor James Vorenberg of the Harvard Law
School expressed his concern about the potentially adverse "effects of his vulnerability to subpoena on a project he [was] conducting to determine the extent .to which drug addicts are involved
in the commission of crimes."8 3 The relationship between researcher and subject is always a fragile and sensitive one, whether or not confidentiality has been promised or even assumed. Yet
there presently appears to be no legal protection for communications between them, and no prospect of legislative safeguards even
of the shield law variety.
79.
80.

See N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1972, at 35, col. 2.
United States v. Doe, 460 F.2d 328 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.

909 (1973).
81. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
82. See Hendel & Bard, Should There Be A Researchers' Privilege?, 59 AAUP
BULL. 398, 399 (1973).

83. Id.
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(2) The researcher-subject relationship is not the only vulnerable
confidence in the academic community. Inquiries into communications between teacher and student, or teacher and administrator,
may raise similar problems. Several years ago, just such an issue
came before the New York courts.8 4 Shortly after the massive

drug raid in January 1968 at the State University of New York at
Stony Brook, a grand jury began investigations into campus use
of narcotics. Several faculty members were subpoenaed by the
district attorney. Although the precise scope of the inquiry had

not been announced, the professors understood they would be
asked whether they had used drugs with students, whether they
had advocated to students the use of drugs, and whether they had
discussed with university officials either the use or advocacy of
drugs. Government employees, including teachers, could not refuse with impunity to appear before a grand jury,8 5 although the
Supreme Court had held that New York state officers could not con-

stitutionally be forced to choose between6 their jobs and the right
8
to invoke the self-incrimination privilege

The subpoenaed professors argued that the anticipated questions would violate their first amendment right to academic freedom

by requiring them to breach confidential relations within the
academic community. They argued that such inquiries infringed

upon individual rights which the Supreme Court had recently
84. In re Boikess v. Aspland, 24 N.Y.2d 136, 247 N.E.2d 135, 299 N.Y.S.2d 163
(1969).
85. Id. at 140-42, 247 N.E.2d at 137-38, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 166-68.
86. In Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968), a police officer appearing before a grand jury refused to answer questions about his performance of official duties
after having been advised of his privilege against self-incrimination, and after having
been requested to sign a waiver of immunity upon penalty of being fired. In a suit
for reinstatement, the Supreme Court ruled that his employment could not be terminated solely for refusing to execute a waiver of a constitutional right. Id. at 278-79.
In Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S.
280 (1968), twelve employees of the Sanitation Department were discharged for
refusing to testify before the Commissioner of Investigation concerning their
official conduct on the grounds of self-incrimination. Three other employees had
answered questions, but when they appeared before a grand jury and were requested
to sign waivers of immunity, they refused. The Court held that public employees
cannot be subjected to a choice between their jobs or their constitutional rights.
Id. at 284-85.
Although no person may be dismissed from a job for refusing to waive his constitutional rights, in both cases the Court implied that a person may be dismissed
from public employment for refusing to answer specific questions relating to his
official duties, provided he is not required to waive his constitutional rights. 392
U.S. at 278; 392 U.S. at 284.
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recognized in the disclaimer loyalty oath cases. 8 7 The New York
Court of Appeals rejected the analogy, however, finding the challenge to the grand jury investigation to be inapplicable. 88 Much
like Justice Powell's view of Branzburg, the majority deferred
consideration of first amendment issues until specific questions
were posed which might threaten a confidential relationship. In
a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Fuld cautioned:
We would have to be blind to reality not to recognize
that a subpoena commanding a teacher to appear before
the Grand Jury-a body not given, ordinarily, to academic
discussion-to testify, against his will, concerning his
talks with students or his lectures in class is suppressive
and intimidating in effect, even though the questions
may not be designed to expose him as a criminal but merely
as the holder of unpopular views. How better to inhibit
open discussion, the vital quickening current of education itself, than by such means?... Were District Attorneys
to take encouragement, from the court's opinion, to summon before Grand Juries teachers whose utterances were
unorthodox, though not criminal, we might well have a
shadow cast over classrooms and universities of the very
kind the First Amendment was designed to avert .... 8 9
(3). There is still another threat to confidential relationships
which arises in the academic community. When a faculty member
brings to the national office of the American Association of University Professors a complaint of academic freedom violation, an
informal inquiry precedes any formal investigation. During the
initial phase, views may be sought from campus officers of the
AAUP chapter, members of the administration, and others knowledgeable about the case. Frequently, the Association will either
arrange an informal settlement or decide that no formal action is
warranted. In one recent case, where a faculty member had been
denied a salary increase, the AAUP conducted an informal inquiry
and decided against a formal probe. The faculty member then re87. E.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). Appellants, university professors and a non-faculty employee, were fired or threatened with dismissal when they refused to take a loyalty oath. The Court held that academic freedom
is "a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.'" Id. at 603.
88. 24 N.Y.2d at 141-42, 247 N.E.2d at 138, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 167-68.
89. Id. at 145-46, 247 N.E.2d at 140, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 170-71.

19751

SHIELD LAWS

tained an attorney and brought suit in the federal district court.90
The college instituted discovery proceedings against various third
persons, including the national AAUP. Since the informal inquiry
had resulted in no formal action, the college believed the AAUP
investigative file might contain information favorable to its position in the suit.
The original request to the AAUP was almost limitless. Lawyers
for the college sought, inter alia, all memoranda, correspondence,
documents or writings of any kind whatsoever showing, dealing
with, or discussing the employment of the professor at the college.
Had the national organization been forced to surrender to the college administration confidential communications received from
campus chapter officers and other faculty members, future informal
inquiries would have been virtually impossible once the vulnerability of the resulting fie was known. The parties eventually reached
an accommodation and the court granted a limiting order which
protected all those communications the AAUP deemed confidential.
Prior to this agreement, the court had indicated its inclination to
narrow the scope of the subpoena, more on practical than on constitutional grounds.
(4) In the spring of 1970 a group of 45 faculty members at the
State University of New York at Buffalo was arrested for conducting a peaceful Sunday morning demonstration in the office of the
University's president. 91 Soon after criminal charges were filed,
the district attorney served on the university administration sub.poenas calling for production of personnel records of the arrested
faculty members and other teachers involved in the incident. The
administration was to produce all personnel files including but
not limited to letters of recommendation and correspondence with
previous employers. The District Attorney sought the University's
complete fies on several experimental colleges thought to be centers of radical faculty and student activity, and demanded other
information, such as the amount of university support to the student newspaper.
The faculty members immediately took steps to protect the confidentiality of their personnel fies. Their attorney obtained a show
cause order. Some weeks later, the prosecutor agreed to a stipula, 90. The suit was eventually reported as Jervey v. Martin, 336 F. Supp. 1350
(W.D. Va. 1972).
91. See State Univ. v. Denton, 35 App. Div. 2d 176, 177, 316 N.Y.S.2d 297, 299

(4th Dep't 1970).
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tion whereby the university would have to produce only the signed
loyalty oath cards-which were, after all, a matter of public record. Personnel files which had already been given the district
attorney were to be returned without being examined. Thus, the
case had a happy ending and there was no occasion for a decision
on the extremely sensitive
issue of compelled disclosure of con92
fidential communications.
(5) Public libraries have also experienced major threats to confidential records. In the summer of 1970, Internal Revenue Service
agents began asking libraries in several cities for records of all
borrowers of books about explosive devices. The Service justified
the practice as "routine-just a continuous building of information93
... in line with the proliferation of bombings across the country."
Later in the summer, the Secretary of the Treasury publicly stated
that no agency of the Treasury Department was undertaking such
an investigation. In addition, he expressed the Treasury Department's strong opposition to such methods of gathering information,
and to such conduct by its agents. 94 (There were also some practical problems. It turned out that one of the publications on the
".suspect" list was a pamphlet about explosives obtainable for a
quarter from the Government Printing Office.) While the searches
were discontinued, some damage had already been done. In Milwaukee, one of the three major target cities, the director of the
public library system had been ordered to release to Treasury
agents borrowing slips for a fifteen month period for all books
labelled "explosives." The city attorney ruled that "there is no
such thing as private records" in a public library, and the library
board did not resist. 95 Thus, the investigative purpose was accomplished despite the Treasury Department's own repudiation
of these demands.
The American Library Association strongly opposed these
inquiries and urged librarians to take additional steps to resist
them in the future. Among the recommendations was the suggestion
that each library "[flormally adopt a policy which specifically rec92. Long after the subpoena issue had been resolved, the Appellate Division
reversed the contempt citation against the 45 faculty members. State Univ. v. Denton, 35 App. Div. 2d 176, 316 N.Y.S.2d 297. The initial arrests had been based on
alleged violation of a general trial court injunction which was issued following
earlier student disorders on the Buffalo campus.
93. N.Y. Times, July 31, 1970, at 28, col. 3.
94. N.Y. Times, July 30, 1970, at 30, col. 7.
95. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1970, at 8, col. 6.
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ognizes its circulation records to be confidential in nature." 9 6 The
Association also urged that information should not be made available to any governmental investigator or body except under compulsory process. Further, librarians should "resist the issuance
of any such process, order or subpoena until such time as a proper
showing of good cause has been made in a court of competent juris9
diction." 7
(6) Bank records may appear less sensitive than library borrower
lists or university personnel files, but difficult questions have
arisen in this context as well. At the height of governmental concern over antiwar protests and demonstrations, investigators sought
to obtain information about radical groups by gaining access to
their bank deposits. The most notable case involved the Fifth
Avenue Peace Parade Committee, an antiwar group from whom
some 15,000 people bought tickets for bus rides to Washington for
the November 1969 moratorium march. The Committee claimed
that FBI agents were given access to its bank deposits. The bank
denied the charge. A spokesman for the American Bankers Association conceded that no law precluded such disclosures, but insisted that banks maintained "a very, very strong policy of keeping
information confidential."9 8 Nonetheless, the Committee brought
suit against the FBI, charging that agents had obtained from the
bank's records the names of individuals who purchased the moratorium tickets. 9 9 The case apparently never came to trial, for there
is no report of further proceedings.
(7) Shortly after United States Circuit Judge (and former
Governor) Otto Kerner was indicted on charges of bribery, the
Justice Department sought certain information from the American
Bar Association. Specifically, government attorneys had a subpoena
issued for records of the ABA Committee on the Federal Judiciary
which had reviewed Kerner's qualifications prior to his appointment to the bench. The declared purpose of the Justice Department
inquiry was to find out whether the Bar Association had uncovered
any evidence of the wrongdoing which eventually resulted in
Kerner's indictment and conviction. The records were in the possession of Chicago lawyer Albert E. Jenner (later minority counsel
for the House Judiciary Committee in the Nixon impeachment
96.
97.
98.
99.

19 NEWSLETTER ON INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 65 (1970).
Id.
N.Y. Times, July 14, 1970, at 7, col. 3.
Id.
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proceeding). Jenner refused, on the Committee's behalf, to release the Kerner file, claiming that the Committee's role in screening judicial candidates and nominees would be "finished" if disclosure of the resulting data could be compelled. This, explained
Jenner, "is very much like the privilege being claimed by reporters
-if you can't protect the confidentiality of your sources, nobody
will talk to you."' 100
The ABA-Kerner case brings us full circle. Clearly, the situations we have reviewed resemble the newsmen's confidential
source cases in several respects. Many of the arguments advanced
by the journalist against a subpoena or a grand jury interrogation
find striking parallels in the cases of the researcher, the professor,
the public librarian, the political group, or the ABA judicial qualification committee. Just as clearly, however, none of the analogous
claims to confidentiality enjoys any form of statutory protection;
nor is any legislature likely to extend the shield law to these other
contexts. Even if every one of these cases were to be covered by
specific legislation other threats would soon emerge beyond the
borders of an extended "shield." It would be neither practical nor
possible to anticipate all the situations in which a confidential relationship might be jeopardized by a governmental demand for
information. Thus, the very breadth and complexity of the issues
cited by the Branzburg Court to emphasize the need for legislative
action 101 is, in fact, a basis for the opposite conclusion when the
total constitutional context is perceived.
As an alternative to the unsatisfactory quest for protection
through legislation, a sharper delineation of the constitutional
issues is needed. The concluding sections of this article offer a
preliminary analysis of those issues.
B. The Constitutional Case for What the Shield Cannot Do
In order to bring together a number of rather diverse strands,
it may be useful to identify the common ingredients of a comprehensive constitutional standard.
(1) The Common Elements
What do the claims of the Harvard researcher, the Milwaukee
librarian, the New York political group, the Buffalo professor, the
100.

N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1972, at 44,col. 1.

101.

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 703-06. But cf. FoI DIGEST, Mar.-Apr.

1973, at 2. See also SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 48-52.
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Stony Brook instructor, and Mr. Jenner's ABA committee have in
common with one another and with the claims of the journalist
seeking to withhold sources? Several similarities emerge.
First, in every case a confidential relationship clearly exists.
Whether or not there has been an explicit promise of confidentiality, the expectation of secrecy has undoubtedly contributed to
the decision to impart sensitive information. Sometimes an expectation of confidentiality is just inherent in the relationship, and at
other times it arises out of the situation or past practice. To insist
that a pledge of secrecy be made explicit would run quite counter
to human experience; indeed, the need for protection may be
greatest in the very situation where trust and confidence make
an explicit guarantee inappropriate or superfluous.
Second, compelling disclosure of confidential communication
in cases such as those above would have detrimental effects, both
immediate and long term. Initially there could be hazards both
for the persons involved in the communication and for innocent
third parties. In some cases disclosure might even endanger the
life of the holder of the information-as in the case of a reporter
who has gained information in confidence about radical political
organizations, underground criminal activity, or Black Panther
Party operations. 10 2 Even more serious are the long term effects
upon the future capacity for confidential relations of the person
who is forced to divulge on even a single occasion. A reporter who
reveals confidential sources can no longer be trusted, 10 3 nor can
a professor who discloses what his students have told him in confic6tnce, nor an ABA committee that reveals data gathered in the
course of screening a judicial nominee. While the consequences
of breaching a confidence may not always jeopardize the practice of one's profession they are, nonetheless, likely to be extremely
serious.

102.

Several affidavits submitted by the petitioner in the Caldwell case at the

district court level attest to these correerns. 311 F. Supp. 358. An affidavit of one
black reporter stated that a black journalist in Caldwell's position could be placed
in personal danger by his appearance before a grand jury. Comment, supra note 4,
at 1206 n.38, quoting Affidavit of Thomas A. Johnson, at 3, attached to Brief for
Petitioner, In re Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1970). Another newsman
stated that he had been threatened by members of a group with whom he had gone
to Cuba. Id., quoting Affidavit of Min S. Yee, at 4, attached to Brief for Newsweek
as Amicus Curiae, In re Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
103. See Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a
Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317, 320 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Note].
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Third, compelled disclosure in all these cases would deter or
chill the exercise of first amendment rights of expression or association. 10 4 In the case of a journalist and his confidential sources
the potential effect of disclosure upon the newsgathering function
of the press is substantial and direct. 10 5 The relationship between
compelled disclosure and first amendment freedoms may be less
obvious in the other cases, yet the connection does exist. For example, if federal agents or legislative committees could freely
obtain the bank records of an active political group, then several
consequences might follow. The political organization could, of
course, avoid all banks and conduct its business strictly in cash
by relying upon individual officers for the safekeeping of funds.
But such an approach would severely limit an organization's activities and make impractical, for instance, the sale of tickets to 15,000
peace marchbrs-as in the case of the Fifth Avenue Peace Parade
Committee. 10 6 Alternatively, if the organization continued to
use a bank it would have to warn contributors that their identities
might be revealed if investigators should demand access to the bank
records. The almost certain effect of such an admonition would
be to deter many potential contributors who might desire to support
the group and its goals but would not risk public identification. By
analogy to cases in which the Supreme Court has sustained claims
to anonymity--especially where membership in unpopular organizations was at stake-this result would seem
to make the demand
10 7
for disclosure constitutionally unacceptable.
The interest of a library patron in being able to borrow controversial books without having FBI agents looking over his shoulder
seems obvious. While the library might be able directly to restrict
08
circulation of a particular volume, or even withdraw it altogether,
104. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 720-22 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

105. "Id. at 722 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
A reporter is no better than his source of information. Unless he has a
privilege to withhold the identity of his source, he will be the victim of
governmental intrigue or aggression. If he can be summoned to testify
in secret before a grand jury, his sources will dry up and the attempted
exposure, the effort to enlighten the public, will be ended....
Id.
106. N.Y. Times, July 14, 1970, at 7, col. 3.
107. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958), all of which suggest the unconstitutionality of requiring public
disclosure of membership in an unpopular organization or cause.
108. For a broader discussion of these issues, see O'Neil, Libraries, Liberties
and the FirstAmendment, 42 U. CiN. L. REV. 209, 216-41 (1973).
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it is quite another matter to accomplish the same result indirectly

by holding the constant threat over borrowers that their literary
preferences might turn up in a congressional committee report. 10 9
If there is a constitutional right to read material that cannot be
banned, 110 then the application of the first amendment to the disclosure of borrower slips should clearly follow.
The constitutional interests militating against disclosure should
be plainly apparent in the case of a researcher. If a scholar must
warn all subjects that information they give may be freely subpoenaed, there is likely to be much less inquiry into highly sensitive areas of the social sciences. Although scholars and researchers
have a strong obligation to be candid and accurate about their data,
sources, and research methods, there are times when information
should be withheld. The comment of Professor John K. Fairbank
in connection with the Popkin case is pertinent:
My observation is that a subpoena has an effect of intimidation both on the person subpoenaed and on those
who might haLe contact with him. I can testify from personal knowledge that in the early 1950's . . . the wide-

spread subpoend of China scholars had the public effect of
inhibiting realistic thinking about China, and I believe
the result carried over into unrealistic thinking about
Chinese relations with Vietnam and helped to produce
our difficulties there.'1 '
The constitutional interest in free communication between
student and teacher should also be apparent. Although the Supreme
109. The situation is analogous to that in Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S.
301, where the Supreme Court unanimously struck down a statute requiring that
persons wishing to receive mail from Communist countries must fill out a signed
card for each such piece of mail. This disclosure requirement was held to violate the
first amendment.
110. See O'Neil, supra note 108, at 239.
The basis for a constitutional right to read seems logically compelling,
but it is not squarely embedded in constitutional lav. There are many
useful fragments and analogies, but nothing precisely in point, even in
the lower federal and state courts. The Supreme Court has often spoken
approvingly of the right to receive information as a corollary of free expression, but has never based a decision solely on the reader's or listener's
claims. Where first amendment interests have been sustained, the writer
or speaker has always been present. Since precedent does not fully suffice, we must continue to reason partly from logic.
111. This statement is quoted in Lewis, The Grand Jury, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24,
1972, at 35, col. 3.
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Court has never defined academic freedom in precisely this way,
it has frequently indicated its deep concern for free discussion within the classroom and has made academic freedom an explicit basis
11 2
for striking down several disclaimer oaths required of teachers.
Perhaps the most explicit reference to academic freedom as a constitutionally protected freedom came in the decision halting the
investigation and prosecution of students and faculty involved in
the Kent State University tragedy of May 1970. The district court
enjoined further criminal proceedings and ordered a highly inflammatory grand jury report to be destroyed.1 13 Much of the
essential proof came from faculty members who testified that their
freedom to teach had been impaired by the grand jury and its accusations. The court found this evidence compelling:
When thought is controlled, or appears to be controlled,
when pedagogues and pupils shrink from free inquiry at a
state university because of a report of a resident Grand
Jury, then academic freedom of expression is impermissibly
impaired. This will curb conditions essential to fulfill114
ment of the university's learning purposes.
Thus, it should be clear that confidence and trust between
professor and student are vital to education. Forced disclosure
which serves to poison or chill that relationship renders the educational process a sterile and formal dialogue. Since communication within the classroom enjoys a measure of constitutional protection, little doubt should remain about the status of faculty-student
discussions outside of class, whether the subject be philosophy,
physics, or (as in the Stony Brook case) marijuana.
The nature of the constitutional interest in the personnel record cases--both the case of the Buffalo subpoena and the AAUP
inquiry-has already been suggested. Clearly, the candid evaluation of a faculty member by his peers should constitute a protected
expression. Just as clearly, forced disclosure of these evaluations
would make future confidential evaluations virtually impossible.
It would be difficult to imagine a system of academic promotion
112. E.g., Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,

385 U.S. 589 (1967); cf. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt,
377 U.S. 360 (1964).
113. Hammond v. Brown, 323 F. Supp. 326, 358 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
114. Id. at 350. For other expressibns of judicial concern for the scope of academic freedom in the classroom, see Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir.
1969); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
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and tenure where every report written by one faculty member
(or dean, or department chairman) about another might become
a matter of public record. This situation would make honest evaluation impossible. Either there would have to be a system of "instant tenure," in which everyone receives job security at the time
of initial hiring or, more likely, a system in which promotions and
rewards were subject to personal whim, changing enrollments,
individual popularity, and other such ephemeral factors. Thus, the
confidentiality of academic personnel files is absolutely vital to
15
effective academic personnel administration.'
The constitutional interest in the ABA judicial selection committee's confidentiality is subtle. But there is a plausible first
amendment claim here, to be sure, which is closely analogous
to that of a journalist. Besides the first amendment, there may be a
separate interest in insuring the most careful review of judicial
nominees. Surely there is a general governmental interest in the
high quality of the federal judiciary-an interest which probably
finds its roots in the Constitution. 116 The role and responsibility
of the organized bar in the process of selection should be substantial. If the bar were no longer able to play a role in evaluating
proposed judges, the quality of the judiciary might not directly
suffer, but surely the confidence of the practicing bar in the judiciary would be adversely affected. Thus, the compelled disclosure
of files such as the one Mr. Jenner so vigorously protected would
undoubtedly have grave constitutional implications.
The wide variety of constitutional interests raised by these
cases casts additional doubt on the wisdom of special legislation to
protect any of them. While the Supreme Court has not given great
cause for optimism, even in the seemingly most appealing case of
the journalist, neither has it ever denied protection in the analogous
contexts we have reviewed. Few of these issues have ever been
presented to the courts at all, much less to the Supreme Court.
What we need now is a constitutional framework within which to
fit the various pieces of the puzzle.
115. This comment is not meant to suggest that faculty members should be
denied access to their own files under appropriate conditions. Most universities
have policies which permit at least knowledge of the contents of the faculty member's own personnel file, and sometimes an opportunity to inspect those contents.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has suggested that under some conditions a faculty
member has a right to know the reasons for an adverse personnel decision. Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972); see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972).
116. U.S. CONST. art. III.
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(2) Factors in a New Constitutional Test
A constitutional test to cover these various problems of confidentiality should be composed of three major factors: (a) The nature and strength of the constitutional interests which would be
jeopardized by disclosure; (b) the nature and strength of the countervailing interests, either governmental or private; and (c) the
availability of alternative means by which to obtain the information
without breaching the confidence. Each element will be analyzed
briefly.
(a) Constitutional Interests Affected by Disclosure. Much has
already been written about the impact of compelled disclosure
on the work of the journalist."1 7 Not only may such disclosure adversely affect freedom of the press, but it may also hinder the
ability of sources to communicate freely-especially where controversial or unpopular causes seek an outlet. It has been seen in the
preceding section that similar impairments of constitutional rights
may result in other confidential relationships-student-teacher, bankdepositor, library-patron, researcher-subject, etc.-if disclosure is
compelled. In each case, there appears to be not only a substantial
constitutional interest in, confidentiality, but alsq a major threat
to that interest by compelled disclosure.
The analysis of such constitutional interests should be the starting point in tiis overview. Only evidence of a substantial interest
can support a valid claim for legal protection."i 8 To some degree
every revelation of a confidential communication may restrict
freedom of expression or association. But surely, the Constitution
does not preyent a court from probing into communications among
criminal conspirators simply because "speech" is involved. No constitutional scholar would seriously argue that a confidence should
be protected before a grand jury simply because the parties so believed or intended it to be. 119
117. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 4; Note, supra note 103.
118. There is no simple or easy definition of the term "substantial" in this context. Obviously those interests that claim clear constitutional protection are "substantial." But' other interests falling short of first amendment stature may also merit
consideration. The issue of substantiality must be determined in each case, as
objectively as possible. Since the application of any test in this area requires a
weighing of several elements, the strength and clarity of the interest in protecting
or withholding information may remain flexible.
119. Clearly beyond the scope of this requirement is the vaguely analogous crim-

inal informant's privilege, which would be recognized without regard to any constitutional interest in confidentiality. See, e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300
(1967).
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Appraisal of the constitutional claim should not be confined
to the interests of the immediate parties to the communication. Consideration should also be given to larger public interests that may
be implicated in the confidential communication. In the cases of
reporter and researcher, for example, the most compelling basis
for a first amendment privilege may be the great value of keeping
the public or the scholarly community well informed about matters
of vital interest.120 Even if it is decided that newsgathering or social
science research per se is beyond the reach of the first amendto
ment, reporters and researchers might nevertheless be entitled
21
claim constitutional protection on behalf of their sources. 1
Assessment of the larger public interest is more difficult in
some of the other cases we have examined. Where the bank records
of the antiwar group were subpoenaed, for example, the interests
would appear to be confined to the parties. Yet if such surveillance
had deterred substantial numbers of people from joining antiwar
protests and demonstrations-and this may well have been the goal
of the FBI-then surely the public would have been hurt by having been misled as to the extent of anti-Vietnam War feeling in this
country. There is a similar public interest in having a complete
and candid evaluation of candidates for coll~ge and university teaching positions and for appointments to the federal bench. If the
evaluation processes are truncated or diluted by compelled disclosure of files then the general public, as well as the immediate
parties, would certainly suffer.
Thus, in determining whether a confidential communication
should enjoy immunity from compulsory disclosure one must consider more than simply the nature of the immediate relationship.
One must also judge the possibility of adverse effects on connected
relationships and, more broadly, upon related public interests.
Only if there is a substantial constitutional interest in protecting
the particular source or content of the communication would the
inquiry proceed to the next stage.
120. See Hendel & Bard, supra note 82, at 398.
121. See Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Kleindeinst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). The district court
determined that the first amendment affords not merely a right to speak freely, but

a right to hear as well. 325 F. Supp. at 631-32.
Accordingly, any problem of standing to sue becomes illusory. Reporters and
researchers, undei this theory, are able to claim a first amendment protection of
confidentiality belonging to their sources because any demand for revelation of
such sources violates their personal right to hear these sources.
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(b) Countervailing Governmental and Private Interests. It is
essential to balance the claim of confidentiality with the reasons
requiring disclosure. Where a grand jury seeks evidence of major
criminal activity, the countervailing interest may be compelling.
But where a private litigant simply seeks confirmation of the facts
of his case the reason is obviously less compelling. Between these
two situations fall most of the cases we have reviewed.
Consider, for example, the Treasury Department's attempts to
determine who had borrowed books about explosives from the Milwaukee public library. 122 If the object of the inquiry were to compile a list of suspects who had been, or were, likely to become
involved in the bombing of campus and public buildings, the rationale seems tenuous indeed. Surely, evidence that a person has
borrowed a book about explosives does not justify the invocation of
his criminal prosecution. Even as a rational basis for placing certain persons under surveillance there is considerable doubt about
both the efficacy and the propriety of detective work such as this.
If, on the other hand, the purpose were to reduce the circulation
of literature about bombs-either by causing librarians to withdraw
such materials or by scaring away potential borrowers-then the
goal would be wholly illegitimate. 12 3 Even the Secretary of the
Treasury, when confronted with evidence of what his agents in the
field had done, could offer no plausible rationale.124
The Government's interest in finding out what the American
Bar Association knew about Governor Kerner's malfeasance similarly
seems tenuous. The state of the ABA's pre-appointment knowledge
could have no bearing 'upon the criminal trial. Moreover, since
the primary responsibility for screening potential judges is that
of the Justice Department, not the organized bar, the true objective of requesting disclosure may very well have been to protect
the Justice Department from charges that it should have done a
better job of checking Kerner's background, or to get additional
leads that would bolster the prosecution. Neither interest seems
at all substantial. It is not surprising, therefore, that the United
States Attorney acquiesced when the subpoena was challenged.
One of our cases involved a private, rather than a public, interest in compelling disclosure. The demand for information from
122.
July 3,
123.
124.

See 19 NEWSLETTER ON INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 65 (1970); N.Y. Times,
1970, at 8, col. 5.
See O'Neil, supra note 108, at 239-41.
N.Y. Times, July 30, 1970, at 30, col. 7.

19751

SHIELD LAWS

the national AAUP files in the professor's nonreappointment suit
was made by the administration of the college. Although the request offered no supporting reasons, it may be inferred that the
college hoped the ifie would contain information damaging to the
faculty member's claim or favoring the administration's. This interest is not without substance, and seems entitled to greater
weight than, for example, the interest of the Buffalo district attorney
in seeing the full contents of faculty personnel files. Thus, the college's interests may weigh more heavily in the balance than others
would, although the constitutional claim against disclosure also
seems to be an unusually strong one.
It is obviously neither possible nor appropriate to list here a
hierarchy of interests favoring disclosure. The Supreme Court suggested in Branzburg that the orderly administration of the crim125
inal law should rank high on the disclosure side of the balance.
Quite recently this suggestion seems to have been underscored
in the presidential tapes case, 126 where the President's claim to
confidentiality under the rubric of executive privilege was recognized by the Court. But that claim was overriden by "a subpoena
essential to the enforcement of criminal statutes" and "the legitimate needs of the judicial process." 12 7 The Court's discussion of
the particular balance between conflicting interests strongly implies that a lesser claim to access-the needs of a private litigant
in a civil suit, for example-would be insufficient to override a
valid claim of executive privilege. Apart from the particular balance
struck in the presidential tapes case, the Court's general approach
seems more consistent with Justice Powell's "case-by-case balanc28
ing" than with the rather rigid formula of the Branzburg plurality.'
The foregoing should not suggest, however, that a private plaintiff may never overcome a substantial claim of confidentiality. In
defamation cases, for example, there may be times when withholding the identity of an anonymous source will produce a serious
miscarriage of justice. In the Garland case the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit ordered a columnist to reveal
the source because this information was held to be essential to the
plaintiff's ability to redress a very substantial injury. 129 Recently,
125.
126.

408 U.S. at 690.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).

127. Id. at 707.
128. 408 U.S. at 667.

129. 259 F.2d at 551.
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in an action for defamation, 130 the United States Court of Appeals
for District of Columbia reached a similar result and found Garland to be unimpaired by Branzburg.13 ' The proper approach,

said the court,
is that the court will look to the facts on a case-by-case
basis in the course of weighing the need for testimony in
question against the claims of the
newsman that the pub32
lic's right to know is impaired.1
On the other hand, another federal appellate court recently
declined to order disclosure of an anonymous source in a libel
suit brought by a public official after finding little likelihood that
the information sought by the plaintiff would enable him to prove
the requisite degree of "malice" to get his case to the jury. 13 3 And,
it will be remembered, the Second Circuit itself upheld the reporter's claim in the Baker case, since the information sought appeared less central to the case than the information at issue in
Garland.1 34 These and other recent civil cases do suggest substantial acceptance of Justice Powelrs "balancing" approach. A
critical element of that formula, whether in a criminal proceeding or a civil suit, is the nature and strength of the countervailing
interest. Only a careful weighing of the claims on both sides- precisely as the Supreme Court did in the presidential tapes case-will
adequately recognize the difficulty and complexity of these cases.
(c) Availability of the Information from Alternative Sources.
Even where a countervailing interest is substantial, and appears
to outweigh the protective claim, the party seeking disclosure
should first be required to exhaust all other avenues of obtaining
the information he seeks. 135 The application of this principle to
confidential communications is analogous to the principle that
"even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved." 136 Thus, if the information is obtainable from a non130.

Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

131. Id. at 636.
132. Id.
133. Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 994 (8th Cir. 1972).
134. Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d at 784.
135. See, e.g., Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. at 1398; State
v. St. Peter, Vt. at -,
315 A.2d at 256.
136. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See also Aptheker v. Secretary
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confidential source, or in ways that would not jeopardize a confidential relationship, the argument for compelled disclosure is
weakened considerably. "
There is some support for the application of this precept to the
context of confidentiality. The Justice Department guidelines on
press subpoenas, issued by then Attorney General Mitchell in the
summer of 1970, require that before resort to compulsory process
"[t]he government should have unsuccessfully attempted to obtain
the information from alternative non-press sources." 137 In the
Baker case, the court stressed this as a factor lacking in its own
fact pattern but present in Garland: "Miss Garland had taken
active steps independently to determine the identity of the confi138
dential news source" before bringing the columnist into court.
An Illinois trial court, while refusing to order newsreel cameramen to surrender films of radical political demonstrations, did
suggest that the result might have been different if "the use of
subpoenas was the only method available of obtaining that evi"139
dence ....

In the several cases presented above, a provision requiring the
party seeking disclosure to exhaust all alternative sources would
have had considerable impact. The case where there was a demand for information from the national AAUP office illustrates the
point. While the interest of the college administration in obtaining the information was substantial, sources other than AAUP investigation files clearly did exist and should have been exploited
first. Since the college made no effort to obtain the same information from other persons on campus, its case for access to the AAUP's
confidential materials was substantially weaker than it might have
been. Had the parties been unable to reach an accommodation,
that factor possibly would have tipped the balance.
Enough has been said to suggest the nature of this third element of the formula. Even if a court finds that an interest in confidentiality would be outweighed by the need for disclosure, a
confidential relationship should not be breached unless the information can be obtained in no other way. Failure to apply this additional criterion in the balancing process would be inconsistent
with a general Supreme Court constitutional doctrine developed
of State, 378 U.S. 500, 516 (1964); Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the ReasonableAlternative, 9 UTAH L. REv. 254 (1964).

137. ABA's Annual Meeting, 39 U.S.L.W. 2110, 2111 (Aug. 25, 1970).
138. 470 F.2d at 784.
139. Comment, supra note 4, at 1222.
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in analogous settings. 140 Surely, the constitutional interest in preserving and protecting confidential relationships deserves no less
a degree of solicitude.
CONCLUSION

The problem of confidentiality will not soon disappear. The
demands by public officials, grand juries, and private litigants for
sensitive information are likely to increase, rather than decrease.
The resolution of the resulting conflicts will be aided only in small
part by the enactment of shield laws protecting the journalist's
source. Such laws are of limited value for several reasons-courts
tend to construe them rather narrowly; they protect only one type
of confidential information-holder; and their presence diverts attention from the more basic constitutional and public policy questions. Thus, no one should be lulled into a false sense of security
by the presence of such laws, or by legislative commitments to
enact them in jurisdictions where they do not now exist. While such
laws may solve easy cases, they are of little value in more complex
situations. The most serious threats to the journalist's first amendment interests have, after all, occurred in shield law states. Therefore, it would be wise to look to the Constitution for protection.141

140. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500; Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479.
141. Congressional hearings on federal legislation continue to take place. N.Y.
Times, Apr. 24, 1975, at 25, col. 4.

